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ABSTRACT
A coalition of agents, or a single agent, has an ethical dilemma
between several statements if each joint action of the coalition
forces at least one specific statement among them to be true. For
example, any action in the trolley dilemma forces one specific group
of people to die. Inmany cases, agents face ethical dilemmas because
they are restricted in the amount of the resources they are ready
to sacrifice to overcome the dilemma. The paper presents a sound
and complete modal logical system that describes properties of
dilemmas for a given limit on a sacrifice.
1 INTRODUCTION
In this paper we study ethical dilemmas faced by agents and coali-
tions of agents in multiagent systems. Consider, for example, a
setting in which the entire populations of four remote villages: v1,
v2, v3, and v4 are affected by an epidemic caused by diseases a and
b. Villages v1, v2, and v3 are affected by disease a and villages v2,
v3, and v4 are affected by disease b, see Figure 1. The medications
against diseases a and b are produced by pharmaceutical companies
ma andmb respectively. The entire population of a village will be
wiped out unless each resident of the village is given medicine
against all diseases her village is affected by. As a part of a philan-
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Figure 1: Arrows represent distribution channels.
thropic initiative, each of the manufacturersma andmb is ready to
donate enough medicine to eradicate diseases a and b, respectively,
from any two villages.
Let us assume that manufacturerma is distributing the medica-
tions directly. Thus, it is facing a moral dilemma:ma must decide
which two out of the three villages v1, v2, and v3 it should send the
medicine to. No matter what decision it makes, this decision will
guarantee the death of an entire population of one of the villages.
We write this dilemma as
[ma :d1,d2,d3]ma,mb 7→2,2,
where statement di stands for “the entire population of village vi is
dead”. In general, statement [C :φ1, . . . ,φn ]s means that coalition
C is facing a moral dilemma because each joint action of coalition
C that satisfies the constraints imposed by a sacrifice function s
predetermines at least one specific statement among φ1, . . . ,φn
to be true. This type of moral dilemma is referred to in the litera-
ture as the “trolley dilemma” [28, 51, 52]. Consider now statement
r =“There is going to be rain tomorrow.” Note that each action of
ma , satisfying the constraintsma ,mb 7→ 2, 2 also predetermines
that one of the four outcomes d1, d2, d3, r will be true. However,
the actual dilemmama faces is only between the first three alter-
natives. To capture this intuition, we will assume that, in order for
statement [C : φ1, . . . ,φn ]s to be true, two conditions must hold:
(i) each joint action of coalition C that satisfies the constraints im-
posed by a sacrifice function s predetermines at least one specific
statement among φ1, . . . ,φn to be true and (ii) set φ1, . . . ,φn must
be a minimal set for which condition (i) holds.
Suppose that manufacturermb delegates the distribution of its
medication to two helper organizations. Organizationh1 distributes
medications between villages v1 and v2 and organization h2 be-
tweenv3 andv4, see Figure 1. Manufacturermb has no control over
how these organizations distribute the medications given to them
or whether they decide to distribute them at all. Then, the action of
mb does not always predetermine which one of v2,v3, or v4 dies:
¬[mb :d2,d3,d4]ma,mb 7→2,2.
However each possible action of manufacturermb guarantees either
the death of v2 or the death of v3 or v4:
[mb :d2,d3 ∨ d4]ma,mb 7→2,2.
Next, suppose that manufacturermb is ready to donate enough
medicine to eradicate disease b in only one village. Then each
possible action of manufacturermb will guarantee either the death
of v2 or the death of both v3 and v4:
[mb :d2,d3 ∧ d4]ma,mb 7→2,1.
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Figure 2:ma andm′a produce medication against disease a.
As the last example, consider the situation depicted in Figure 2.
Here, all four villages are affected by the same disease a. The medi-
cation against this disease is produced bymanufacturersma andm′a .
Suppose that manufacturerma is ready to donate enough medicine
to eradicate disease a from any two villages while manufacturerm′a
is only ready to donate enough medicine to eradicate the disease
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from a single village. If manufacturerma sends the medicine to,
say, villages v1 and v2, then no specific village among v3 and v4 is
guaranteed to die because manufacturerm′a might save it:
¬[ma : d1,d2,d3,d4]ma,m′a 7→2,1.
Similarly, ¬[m′a : d1,d2,d3,d4]ma,m′a 7→2,1. However, no matter how
manufacturers ma and m′a coordinate their actions, one specific
village among v1, v2, v3, and v4 is guaranteed to die:
[ma ,m′a : d1,d2,d3,d4]ma,m′a 7→2,1.
Ethical dilemmas without explicit sacrifice are faced by self-
driving cars choosing between outcomes where different people
are harmed [39, 44] and by policy makers balancing public safety
with individual rights to privacy [9]. Dilemmas with sacrifice (con-
straints on time and resources) are faced by doctors in emergency
hurricane evacuations [27] and by designers of organ transplan-
tation policies [18]. Financial constraints also create dilemmas for
policy makers funding different directions of medical research [49].
As AI technology matures, more of these moral choices will be
made by AI agents. As a result, society is tasked with developing
laws that regulate choices made by such agents. Some of this work
has already begun. For example, Germany introduced ethics rules
for autonomous vehicles [25].
Our work provides a framework for specifying and reasoning
about ethical dilemmas, rather than suggesting how AI agents
should resolve them. Such frameworks could be used as the lan-
guage for writing new laws and regulations as well as to interpret
the existing laws as they apply to AI systems. The main technical
result of our work is a complete logical system that describes the
properties of the ethical dilemma modality [C :φ1, . . . ,φn ]s .
2 OVERVIEW
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section
we review the related literature. In Section 4, we define the syntax
and the semantics of our logical system. In Section 5, we list and
discuss its axioms and inference rules, as well as state its sound-
ness. Section 6 contains the proof of the completeness. Section 7
concludes the paper.
3 LITERATURE REVIEW
The ethical dilemmas that we study in this paper are usually re-
ferred to in the literature as variations of the “trolley dilemma”. The
original trolley dilemma was proposed by Foot [28] as a dilemma
faced by an agent who must choose between allowing five people
to die and killing one person to prevent the death of those five.
The distinction between letting one die and killing someone is also
emphasised by Thomson [51, 52] as well as by Bruers and Braeck-
man [19]. Navarrete, McDonald, Mott, and Asher study the same
distinction in a virtual reality environment [43].
At the same time, others shift the focus of the trolley prob-
lem away from the distinction between letting things happen and
making things happen. Marczyk and Marks empirically studied
whether perceived moral permissibility changed when the person
making a decision in the trolley dilemma stands to benefit from or
be harmed by one of the outcomes [40]. Pan and Slater analysed
participants’ ethical reasoning when they were confronted with
the trolley dilemma through an online survey versus through im-
mersive virtual realities [46]. Chen, Qiu, Li, and Zhang examined
the differences in brain activity of Chinese undergraduates who
experienced the great Sichuan earthquake when confronted with
trolley dilemmic situations where they must choose to rescue one of
two relatives and one of two strangers [24]. Indick, Kim, Oelberger,
and Semino investigated how the gender of a person affects the
decision that she makes in the trolley dilemma-like settings [37].
Bleske-Rechek, Nelson, Baker, Remiker, and Brandt observed that
people are less likely to sacrifice the life of one person for the lives
of five if the one person is young, a genetic relative, or a current
romantic partner [15]. In a related work, Kawai, Kubo, and Kubo-
Kawai showed that most people are more inclined to sacrifice an
older person rather than a younger one [38]. In this paper, we also
consider trolley-like ethical dilemmas in this broader sense.
Althoughwe are not aware of anyworks treating ethical dilemma
as a modality, there are papers that use existing logical formalism
to capture ethical dilemmas. Berreby, Bourgne, and Ganascia used
simplified event calculus to model dilemmas within answer set
programming [12]. Horty suggested using nonmonotonic logic for
reasoning about moral dilemmas [34].
Marc Pauly proposed a logic of coalition power that captures
properties of modality “coalition C has a strategy to achieve φ” [47,
48]. His approach has been widely studied in the literature [1, 2,
10, 16, 29, 31, 42, 50, 53]. An alternative logical system for coalition
power was proposed in [41]. Alur, Henzinger, and Kupferma in-
troduced Alternating-Time Temporal Logic (ATL) that combines
temporal and coalition modalities [7]. Goranko and van Drim-
melen [32] gave a complete axiomatization of ATL. Additionally,
decidability and model checking problems for ATL-like systems
has also been studied in recent works [8, 13, 14]. Another ap-
proach to express “power to achieve" in a temporal setting is STIT
logic [11, 33, 35, 36, 45]. Broersen, Herzig, and Troquard have shown
that coalition logic can be embedded into a variation of STIT logic
with the temporal modality “next-step"[17].
A logical system for constraints by a renewable resource, such
as money, was proposed by Cao and Naumov [23]. Their system
labels modalities with three parameters: agent, profit, and budget.
Unlike this paper, they deal only with power of a single agent, not a
coalition of agents. Alechina, Logan, Nguyen, and Rakib introduced
resource bounded coalitional logic (RBCL) [6]. Many recent works
on resource bounded coalitions have been focused on complexity
of model-checking for different versions of RBCL and ATL with
bounded resources [3–5, 20–22, 26].
The ethical dilemma modality [C :X ]s , even without the sacri-
fice subscript s , cannot be expressed in Marc Pauly logic or any of
its modifications mentioned above. However, this modality, with-
out the sacrifice subscript, can be expressed via socially friendly
coalition power modality introduced by Goranko and Enqvist [30].
They proposed several versions of social friendly modality. The
basic one, [C](φ;ψ1, . . . ,ψn ) stands for “coalition C has an action
profile that guarantees φ and enables the complementary coali-
tion C to realise any one ofψ1, . . . ,ψk by a suitable action profile”.
Our modality without the sacrifice function is expressible through
socially friendly modality as
[C :φ1, . . . ,φn ] ≡ [C](⊤;φ1, . . . ,φn ) ∧
∧
D⊊C
¬[D](⊤;φ1, . . . ,φn ).
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The logical system proposed by Goranko and Enqvist [30], un-
like ours, does not consider resource bounded actions. Thus, our
modality [C :X ]s with the sacrifice function s is not expressible in
their system. They sketch the proof that their axiomatization of
socially friendly modality is complete, but, unlike us, do not claim
strong completeness. The completeness proofs here and in [30] use
different constructions – see our discussion in Section 6. Addition-
ally, none of the axioms in [30] is similar to our main axiom, the
Combination axiom.
4 SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS
In this paper we assume a fixed set A of agents. By a coalition
we mean any nonempty subset of A. By XY we denote the set
of all functions from set Y to set X . Although in the introduction
the value of the sacrifice function was a positive integer (number
of villages the company is ready to help), in general we assume
that sacrifice is an arbitrary real-valued function representing the
maximal cost of the sacrifice that each individual agent is ready to
bear. We allow the sacrifice to be negative. Negative sacrifice is the
minimal profit that an agent expects from an action. In other words,
sacrifice function is an arbitrary function from set RA .
The language Φ of our logical system is defined by the grammar
φ := p | ¬φ | φ → φ | [C :X ]s ,
where C is a coalition, X is a nonempty set of formulae, and s
is a sacrifice function. For the sake of simplicity, we abbreviate
[C : {φ1, . . . ,φn }]s as [C : φ1, . . . ,φn ]s . We assume that Boolean
connectives ∧ and ∨ as well as constants truth ⊤ and false ⊥ are
defined as usual. By ∧X and ∨X we denote the conjunction and
the disjunction of all formulae in X respectively. As usual, ∧ and
∨ are defined to be ⊤ and ⊥, respectively.
Definition 4.1. A game is a tuple (W ,∆, | · |,M,π ), where
(1) W is a set of states,
(2) ∆ is a non-empty set of actions,
(3) |d |aw ∈ R is the “cost” of action d ∈ ∆ for agent a ∈ A in
statew ∈W ,
(4) M ⊆W × ∆A ×W is a relation, called “mechanism”,
(5) π (p) is a subset ofW for each propositional variable p.
In the introductory example depicted in Figure 1, the set W
consists of an initial state init and 16 outcome states. Each outcome
state specifies villages among v1,v2,v3,v4 the entire population of
which survives after the medicine is distributed. In other words,
W = {init} ∪ {X | X ⊆ {v1,v2,v3,v4}}. The set of agents A in
this example is set {ma ,mb }. For the sake of simplicity, we do not
consider helper organizations h1 and h2 as agents facing ethical
dilemmas in this game. Note that, in the introductory example,
different agents have different sets of available actions. Agentma
decides to which villages it will send the medicine. Thus, the set
of actions ∆a of agentma could be represented by sets {X | X ⊆
{v1,v2,v3,v4}}. Agentmb decides how much medicine each of the
helpers h1 and h2 gets. Then, we can assume that the set of actions
∆b of agentmb is N × N. For example, action (1, 2) ∈ ∆b means
that manufacturermb gives helper h1 just enough medicine to save
one village and helper h2 just enough medicine to save two villages.
Having agent-specific domains of actions is not significant. We
can always consider a combined domain of actions and interpret
any additional actions as one fixed “default” action in the original
domain. For the sake of simplicity, Definition 4.1 assumes that the
set of actions is the same for all agents.
In our example, the cost function |d |mw measures the amount of
medicine donated by pharmaceutical companym. In our example,
the cost does not depend on the current state. In general, the cost
may vary from state to state, We measure the amount of medicine
by how many villages the medicine can eradicate the disease in.
For example, |{v1,v2}|mainit = 2.
The mechanism M of a game specifies the rules by which the
game transitions from one state to another. For example,
(init , {(ma , {v1,v2}), (mb , (1, 1))}, {v1,v2,v4}) ∈ M
because, if in the initial state init , manufacturerma sends medicine
to villagesv1 andv2 andmanufacturermb gives a supply ofmedicine
sufficient to save one village to helper h1 and the same amount to
helper h2, then the game might transition into the state where only
population of villages v1, v2, and v4 survives.
Note that our semantics is more general than those in Marc
Pauly’s original works on coalitional logic [47, 48] and Goranko and
Enqvist paper on socially friendly coalition power [30]. Namely, we
assume that mechanism is a relation and not necessarily a function.
In other words, we allow a complete action profile to transition
the game into one of several different states. This means that our
statement [C :φ1, . . . ,φ2] does not imply that the complement of
coalitionC has a strategy to force each of the statements φ1, . . . ,φ2.
Goranko and Enqvist’s statement [C](⊤,φ1, . . . ,φn ) does imply
this. Our approach also allows some complete action profiles to not
result in any next state at all. We interpret this as a termination of
the game.
Throughout this paper, we write f =X д if f (x) = д(x) for each
x ∈ X . We also use shorthand notation captured in the following
definition.
Definition 4.2. |δ |w ≤ s if |δ (a)|aw ≤ s(a) for each agent a ∈ A.
The next definition is the key definition of this paper. Part (4) of
it specifies the formal meaning of the ethical dilemma statement
[C :X ]s . Item 4(a) states that any strategy of coalition C forces a
specific statement φ ∈ X to be true. Item 4(b) states that X is a
minimal set with such property.
Definition 4.3. For each game (W ,∆, | · |,M,π ), each statew ∈W ,
and each formula φ ∈ Φ, the satisfiability relationw ⊩ φ is defined
recursively:
(1) w ⊩ p ifw ∈ π (p), where p is a propositional variable,
(2) w ⊩ ¬φ ifw ⊮ φ,
(3) w ⊩ φ → ψ ifw ⊮ φ orw ⊩ ψ ,
(4) w ⊩ [C :X ]s if
(a) for any strategy t ∈ ∆C of coalition C there is a formula
φ ∈ X such that for any action profile δ ∈ ∆A and any
state u ∈ W if |δ |w ≤ s , t =C δ , and (w,δ ,u) ∈ M , then
u ⊩ φ,
(b) for any nonempty subset Y ⊊ X there is a strategy t ∈ ∆C
of coalition C such that for any formula φ ∈ Y there is an
action profile δ ∈ ∆A and a state u ∈W where |δ |w ≤ s ,
t =C δ , (w,δ ,u) ∈ M , and u ⊮ φ.
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Recall that we allow a game to terminate as a result of agents’
actions. For example, suppose that in a state w an agent a has
three actions d1, d2, d3 all of which have a “cost” of 1. Let action
d1 transition the system into a state in which statement φ1 is true,
action d2 transition the system into a state in which statement
φ2 is true, and action d3 be an action that terminates the system.
Then, w ⊩ [a :φ1,φ2]a 7→1 is true, because each action of agent a
predetermines a specific φi to be true in each outcome state. In
other words, being able to terminate the system does not provide a
way for an agent to “escape” the dilemma.
In the next section we state the axioms of our logical system
that capture the properties of modality [C :X ]s . When stating these
axioms, it will be convenient to define ⟦C :X⟧s as an abbreviation
for formula
∨
,Z ⊆X [C :Z ]s . In other words, ⟦C :X⟧s means that
each action profile of coalition C forces a specific formula in set X
to be true, but set X is not necessarily a minimal such set. We call
expression ⟦C :X⟧s a weak dilemma.
5 AXIOMS
In this section we list and discuss the axioms and inference rules
of our logical system. The first of these axioms uses the notation
X ⊗ Y . For any two sets of formulae X and Y , let X ⊗ Y be the set
of formulae {φ ∧ψ | φ ∈ X ,ψ ∈ Y }.
In addition to propositional tautologies in languageΦ, our logical
system contains the following axioms:
(1) Combination: [C :X ]s → ([C :Y ]s → ⟦C :X ⊗ Y⟧s ),
(2) Monotonicity: [C :X ]s ′ → ⟦D :X⟧s , whereC ⊆ D and s ≤ s ′,
(3) Minimality: [C :X ]s → ¬[C :Y ]s , where Y ⊊ X ,
(4) No Alternatives: [C :X ]s → [D :X ]s , where |X | = 1.
We write ⊢ φ if formula φ ∈ Φ is derivable in our logical system
using the Modus Ponens, the Necessitation, and the Substitution
inference rules
φ, φ → ψ
ψ
φ
[C :φ]s
{φ → τ (φ) | φ ∈ X }
[C :X ]s → ⟦C :τ (X )⟧s ,
for each function τ that maps set Φ into set Φ. If ⊢ φ, then we
say that formula φ is a theorem of our system. We write X ⊢ φ if
formula φ is provable from all theorems of our logical system and
an additional set of formulae X using the Modus Ponens inference
rule only.
The Combination axiom states that if each action profile of coali-
tion C forces a specific formula in set X to be true and a specific
formula in set Y to be true, then each action profile of coalition
C forces a specific formula in set X ⊗ Y to be true. Indeed, if a
particular action profile forces φ ∈ X to be true and ψ ∈ Y to be
true, then this profile also forces φ ∧ψ to be true.
A hypothetical Combination axiomwith the single bracketmodal-
ity in the conclusion [C :X ]s → ([C :Y ]s → [C :X ⊗ Y ]s ) is not
sound. Indeed, suppose that X = Y = {φ,ψ } where φ andψ are two
distinctive formulae. Then, X ⊗ Y = {φ ∧ φ,φ ∧ψ ,ψ ∧ φ,ψ ∧ψ }.
Let w ⊩ [C : φ,ψ ]s for some state w of a game. It follows that
w ⊩ [C :φ ∧φ,ψ ∧ψ ]s . Thus, we havew ⊩ [C :X ]s andw ⊩ [C :Y ]s
but w ⊮ [C : X ⊗ Y ]s . Since {φ ∧ ψ ,ψ ∧ φ} ⊊ X ⊗ Y , statement
w ⊩ [C :X ⊗ Y ]s would violate the minimality condition 4(b) of
Definition 4.3.
The Monotonicity axiom states that if each action profile of
coalition C forces a specific formula in set X to be true under a
more relaxed constraint s ′ on sacrifice, then each action profile of a
larger coalition D forces a specific formula in set X to be true under
a stronger constraint s . A hypothetical Monotonicity axiom with
single bracket modality in the conclusion is also not sound. For
example, [ma :d1,d2,d3]ma,mb 7→2,1 in the setting of Figure 1. How-
ever,¬[ma ,mb :d1,d2,d3]ma,mb 7→2,1. Once an action of agentmb is
fixed, this action will guarantee that the entire population of village
v2 will die or it will guarantee that the entire population of village
v3 will die, see Figure 1. Hence, [ma ,mb : d2,d3]ma,mb 7→2,1 and
¬[ma ,mb :d1,d2,d3]ma,mb 7→2,1 due to the minimality condition.
The Minimality axiom captures the minimality requirement of
item 4(b) in Definition 4.3.
The No Alternatives axiom deals with extreme case of a singleton
set X = {φ}. Note that statement [C :φ]s means that statement φ
is predetermined to be true under any action profile of coalition
C as long as actions of all agents are constrained by s . In other
words, φ is true as long as actions of all agents are constrained by
s . Since the last statement does not depend on the coalition C , we
may conclude that validity of statement [C :φ]s does not depends
on the choice of coalitionC . This observation is captured in the No
Alternatives axiom.
The Necessitation rule states that if formula φ is true in all states
of all games, then statement φ is predetermined to be true under
any action profile of coalition C and any constraint s . Note that in
this case the minimality condition 4(b) of Definition 4.3 is vacuously
satisfied because singleton set {φ} has no nonempty proper subsets.
The Substitution rule says that if [C :X ]s and statement φ in set
X is replaced with a logically weaker statement τ (φ), then each
action profile of coalition C still forces a specific formula in the set
τ (X ) to be true, but τ (X ) is not necessarily the smallest such set.
An example of an instance of this rule is
¬¬φ → φ, ψ → (χ → ψ )
[C :¬¬φ,ψ ]s → ⟦C :φ, χ → ψ⟧s .
Note that X and τ (X ) are sets, not lists. Thus, set τ (X ) might have
fewer elements than set X :
φ → (φ ∨ψ ), ψ → (φ ∨ψ )
[C :φ,ψ ]s → ⟦C :φ ∨ψ⟧s .
Our last example illustrates that even if X satisfies the minimality
condition, set τ (X ) might not:
φ → (φ ∨ψ ), ψ → (ψ ∨ φ)
[C :φ,ψ ]s → ⟦C :φ ∨ψ ,ψ ∨ φ⟧s .
Theorem 5.1 (strong soundness). If X ⊢ φ andw is a state of a
model such thatw ⊩ χ for each formula χ ∈ X , thenw ⊩ φ. □
6 COMPLETENESS
In this section we prove a strong completeness theorem for our
logical system. This proof is split into three subsections. First, we
establish auxiliary properties of modalities [C :X ] and ⟦C :X⟧. Then,
we define the canonical game and prove several lemmas about this
game. Finally, we state and prove completeness theorem.
6.1 Preliminaries
Lemma 6.1. Inference rule φ⟦C :φ⟧s is derivable.
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Proof. Suppose that ⊢ φ. Thus, ⊢ [C :φ]s by the Necessitation
inference rule. Hence, ⊢ ∨,Y ⊆{φ }[C :Y ]s because singleton set
{φ} has only one nonempty subset. Therefore, ⊢ ⟦C : φ⟧s by the
definition of the modality ⟦ ⟧. □
Lemma 6.2. ⊢ ⟦C :X⟧s → (⟦C :Y⟧s → ⟦C :X ⊗ Y⟧s ).
Proof. By the Combination axiom,
⊢ [C :X ′]s →
([C :Y ′]s → ⟦C :X ′ ⊗ Y ′⟧s ) ,
for any nonempty sets X ′,Y ′ ⊆ A. Thus, by the definition of the
modality ⟦ ⟧,
⊢ [C :X ′]s →
(
[C :Y ′]s →
∨
,Z ⊆X ′⊗Y ′
[C :Z ]s
)
.
Suppose that X ′ ⊆ X and Y ′ ⊆ Y . Then X ′ ⊗ Y ′ ⊆ X ⊗ Y . Hence,
by the laws of propositional reasoning,
⊢ [C :X ′]s →
(
[C :Y ′]s →
∨
,Z ⊆X ⊗Y
[C :Z ]s
)
.
Since set X ′ and set Y ′ are arbitrary nonempty subsets of X and Y
respectively, by propositional reasoning,
⊢
∨
,X ′⊆X
[C :X ′]s →
( ∨
,Y ′⊆Y
[C :Y ′]s →
∨
,Z ⊆X ⊗Y
[C :Z ]s
)
.
Therefore, ⊢ ⟦C :X⟧s → (⟦C :Y⟧s → ⟦C :X ⊗Y⟧s ) by the definition
of the modality ⟦ ⟧. □
Lemma 6.3. For each integer n ≥ 1,
⊢ ⟦C :φ⟧s → (⟦C :ψ1, . . . ,ψn⟧s → ⟦C :φ ∧ψ1, . . . ,φ ∧ψn⟧s ).
Proof. The statement of the lemma follows from Lemma 6.2 for
X = {φ} and Y = {ψ1, . . . ,ψn }. □
Earlier we defined ⊗ as a binary operation on the sets of formulae.
In the next lemma we use notationX1 ⊗X2 ⊗ · · · ⊗Xn . If n > 2, then
X1⊗X2⊗· · ·⊗Xn stands for (. . . ((X1⊗X2)⊗X3) . . . )⊗Xn . If n = 1,
then X1 ⊗X2 ⊗ · · · ⊗Xn is set X1. If n = 0, then X1 ⊗X2 ⊗ · · · ⊗Xn ,
is the singleton set {⊤}.
Lemma 6.4. For each integer n ≥ 0,
⊢
∧
i≤n
⟦C :Xi⟧s → ⟦C :X1 ⊗ X2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Xn⟧s .
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on n.
If n = 0, then X1 ⊗ X2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Xn = {⊤}. Note that ⊤ is a
tautology. Thus, ⊢ ⟦C : X1 ⊗ X2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Xn⟧s by the Lemma 6.1.
Then, ⊢ ∧i≤n⟦C :Xi⟧s → ⟦C :X1 ⊗ X2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Xn⟧s , by the laws
of propositional reasoning.
If n = 1, then the following formula is a propositional tautology:
⊢ ∧i≤n⟦C :Xi⟧s → ⟦C :X1 ⊗ X2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Xn⟧s .
If n > 1, then, by the induction hypothesis,
⊢
∧
i≤n−1
⟦C :Xi⟧s → ⟦C :X1 ⊗ X2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Xn−1⟧s .
At the same time, by Lemma 6.2,
⊢ ⟦C :X1 ⊗ X2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Xn−1⟧s →
(⟦C :Xn⟧s → ⟦C :X1 ⊗ X2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Xn⟧s ).
Therefore, ⊢ ∧i≤n⟦C : Xi⟧s → ⟦C : X1 ⊗ X2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Xn⟧s , by
propositional reasoning from the last two statements. □
Lemma 6.5. For each n ≥ 0,
⊢ ⟦C :φ1⟧s ∧ · · · ∧ ⟦C :φn⟧s → ⟦C :φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn⟧s .
Proof. The statement of the lemma follows from Lemma 6.4 for
sets X1 = {φ1}, . . . , Xn = {φn }. □
Lemma 6.6. ⊢ ⟦C :X⟧s → ⟦D :X⟧s , where |X | = 1.
Proof. Note that formula [C : X ]s → [D : X ]s is an instance
of the No Alternatives axiom. Thus, because singleton set X has
only one nonempty subset, ⊢ ∨,Y ⊆X [C :Y ]s → ∨,Y ⊆X [D :Y ]s .
Hence, ⊢ ⟦C :X⟧s → ⟦D :X⟧s by the definition of modality ⟦ ⟧. □
Lemma 6.7. ⊢ ⟦C :X⟧s ′ → ⟦D :X⟧s , where C ⊆ D and s ≤ s ′.
Proof. By the Monotonicity axiom, ⊢ [C :Y ]s ′ → ⟦D :Y⟧s for
each nonempty set of formula Y ⊆ Φ. Thus, by the definition of
modality ⟦ ⟧,
⊢ [C :Y ]s ′ →
∨
,Z ⊆Y
[D :Z ]s .
Suppose now that Y ⊆ X . Then, by propositional reasoning,
⊢ [C :Y ]s ′ →
∨
,Z ⊆X
[D :Z ]s
for any nonempty set Y ⊆ X . Thus, by propositional reasoning,
⊢
∨
,Y ⊆X
[C :Y ]s ′ →
∨
,Z ⊆X
[D :Z ]s .
Therefore, ⊢ ⟦C :X⟧s ′ → ⟦D :X⟧s by the definition of ⟦ ⟧. □
Lemma 6.8. Inference rule
{φ → τ (φ) | φ ∈ X }
⟦C :X⟧s → ⟦C :τ (X )⟧s
is derivable for any function τ from set Φ to set Φ.
Proof. Suppose ⊢ φ → τ (φ) for each φ ∈ X . Consider an arbi-
trary nonempty subset Y ⊆ X . Then, ⊢ φ → τ (φ) for each φ ∈ Y .
Thus, by the Substitution inference rule, ⊢ [C :Y ]s → ⟦C :τ (Y )⟧s .
Hence,
⊢ [C :Y ]s →
∨
,Z ⊆τ (Y )
[C :Z ]s
by the definition of modality ⟦ ⟧. Then, because statement Y ⊆ X
implies that τ (Y ) ⊆ τ (X ),
⊢ [C :Y ]s →
∨
,Z ⊆τ (X )
[C :Z ]s .
Thus, since set Y is an arbitrary nonempty subset of X ,
⊢
∨
,Y ⊆X
[C :Y ]s →
∨
,Z ⊆τ (X )
[C :Z ]s .
Hence, ⊢ ⟦C :X⟧s → ⟦C :τ (X )⟧s by the definition of ⟦ ⟧. □
Lemma 6.9. For each n ≥ 1,
⊢ ⟦C :φ1, . . . ,φn⟧s → ⟦C :φ1 ∨ · · · ∨ φn⟧s .
Proof. Note that φi → φ1 ∨ · · · ∨ φn is a tautology for each
i ≤ n. Therefore, ⊢ ⟦C : φ1, . . . ,φn⟧s → ⟦C : φ1 ∨ · · · ∨ φn⟧s by
Lemma 6.8. □
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Lemma 6.10. ⊢ [C :X ]s → ⟦C :X⟧s .
Proof. Formula [C :X ]s → ∨,Y ⊆X [C :Y ]s is a propositional
tautology. Therefore, ⊢ [C : X ]s → ⟦C : X⟧s by the definition of
modality ⟦ ⟧. □
Lemma 6.11. ⊢ [C :X ]s → ¬∨,Y⊊X ⟦C :Y⟧s .
Proof. Consider any nonempty set Z ⊊ X . Then, by the Min-
imality axiom, ⊢ [C : X ]s → ¬[C : Z ]s . Hence, by propositional
reasoning, ⊢ [C :X ]s → ¬∨,Z⊊X [C :Z ]s . Thus, by propositional
reasoning,
⊢ [C :X ]s → ¬
∨
,Y⊊X
∨
,Z ⊆Y
[C :Z ]s .
Therefore, ⊢ [C : X ]s → ¬∨,Y⊊X ⟦C : Y⟧s by the definition of
modality ⟦ ⟧. □
Lemma 6.12. ⊢ ⟦C :X⟧s ∧ ¬∨,Y⊊X ⟦C :Y⟧s → [C :X ]s .
Proof. The following formula is a propositional tautology:∨
,Y ⊆X
[C :Y ]s ∧ ¬
∨
,Y⊊X
[C :Y ]s → [C :X ]s .
Thus, by propositional reasoning,
⊢
∨
,Y ⊆X
[C :Y ]s ∧ ¬
∨
,Y⊊X
∨
,Z ⊆Y
[C :Z ]s → [C :X ]s .
Therefore, ⊢ ⟦C : X⟧s ∧ ¬∨,Y⊊X ⟦C : Y⟧s → [C : X ]s by the
definition of modality ⟦ ⟧. □
6.2 Canonical Game
In this section we define the canonical game (W ,∆, | · |,M,π ).
Definition 6.13. W is the set of all maximal consistent sets of
formulae.
An action of an agent consists in specifying a set of formula Φ
and a real number c . Informally, set Ψ is a set of “demands” by the
agent and c is the price that she offers to pay for her demands. If c
is negative, then |c | is the profit that the agent requests in addition
to the fulfillment of her demands.
Definition 6.14. ∆ is the set of all pairs (Ψ, c), where Ψ ⊆ Φ is a
set of formulae and c ∈ R is a real number.
When an agent offers to pay or when she requests a profit, the
amount she specifies is exactly the amount she pays or gets.
Definition 6.15. |(Ψ, c)|aw = c .
In the next definition we specify the mechanism of the canonical
game. Informally, this mechanism enforces two conditions: (1) it
either grants all “demands” of all agents or terminates the game and
(2) it makes sure that each time a coalition faces a weak dilemma
⟦C : X⟧s , at least one agent in coalition C demands at least one
formula in set X ; if not, the game is terminated.
For any pair u = (x ,y) by pr1(u) and pr2(u) we mean elements x
and y respectively.
Definition 6.16. MechanismM is the set of all triples (w,δ ,u) ∈
W × ∆A ×W such that:
(1) pr1(δ (a)) ⊆ u for each agent a ∈ A,
(2) for each formula ⟦C :X⟧s ∈ w , if |δ |w ≤ s , then there is an
agent a ∈ C such that set pr1(δ (a)) ∩ X is not empty.
Definition 6.17. π (p) = {w ∈W | p ∈ w}.
This concludes the definition of the canonical game. Both our
construction and the one sketched by Goranko and Enqvist in
their proof of completeness of socially friendly coalition logic [30]
modify Marc Pauly’s construction for the completeness of coalition
power logic in a significant way. Marc Pauly’s construction could
be interpreted in terms of each agent voting for a single formula in
a single-round voting [48]. If the right group of agents votes for the
right formula, then the group’s wish is guaranteed to be granted.
Goranko and Enqvist propose a two-round voting mechanism in
which agents that fail to achieve their goals in the first round get
a chance to vote for a second formula. Technically, both rounds
are carried out on the same ballot. In our construction, each single
agent votes for a set of formulae and specifies a price that she is
ready to pay. The mechanism either satisfies the demands of all
agents or terminates the game.
As usual, the key step in a proof of completeness is an induction,
or “truth”, lemma. In our case this is Lemma 6.20. The induction
step in the proof of this lemma for a formula of the form [C :X ]s is
based on the next two auxiliary lemmas.
Lemma 6.18. For any state w ∈ W , any formula ⟦C :X⟧s ∈ w ,
and any strategy t ∈ ∆C of coalitionC , there is a formula φ ∈ X such
that for each action profile δ ∈ ∆A and each state u ∈W , if |δ |w ≤ s ,
t =C δ , and (w,δ ,u) ∈ M , then φ ∈ u.
Proof. Consider any state w ∈ W , any formula ⟦C :X⟧s ∈ w ,
and any strategy t ∈ ∆C of coalition C .
Case I: There is an agent a0 ∈ C such that pr1(t(a0))∩X , . Let φ
be any formula such that φ ∈ pr1(t(a0)) ∩X . Then φ ∈ X . Consider
any action profile δ ∈ ∆A and any state u ∈W such that |δ |w ≤ s ,
t =C δ , and (w,δ ,u) ∈ M . To prove the lemma, it suffices to show
that φ ∈ u. Indeed, assumption t =C δ implies that pr1(t(a0)) =
pr1(δ (a0)) because a0 ∈ C . Thus, φ ∈ pr1(t(a0)) = pr1(δ (a0)) by the
choice of formula φ. Note that pr1(δ (a0)) ⊆ u by the assumption
(w,δ ,u) ∈ M and item 2 of Definition 6.16. Therefore, φ ∈ u.
Case II: pr1(t(a)) ∩ X =  for each agent a ∈ C . Let φ be an
arbitrary formula in language Φ. To finish the proof of the lemma,
it suffices to show that there is no action profile δ ∈ ∆A and state
u ∈W , such that |δ |w ≤ s , t =C δ , and (w,δ ,u) ∈ M . Suppose, for
the sake of contradiction, that such an action profile and a state
exist. Then statement t =C δ implies that pr1(δ (a)) ∩ X =  for
each agent a ∈ C by the assumption of the case. Hence, (w,δ ,u) <
M by part 2 of Definition 6.16 and because |δ |w ≤ s , which is a
contradiction. □
Lemma 6.19. For any statew ∈W and any formula¬⟦C :X⟧s ∈ w ,
there is a strategy t ∈ ∆C of coalition C such that for any formula
φ ∈ X there is an action profile δ ∈ ∆A and a state u ∈ W where
|δ |w ≤ s , t =C δ , (w,δ ,u) ∈ M , and φ < u.
Proof. Let the set of pairs R and the set of formulae Σ be defined
as follows:
R = {(D,Y ) | ⟦D :Y⟧s ∈ w,D ⊆ C}, (1)
Σ = {∨Z | ⟦E :Z⟧s ∈ w,E ⊈ C}. (2)
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By a choice function λ we mean any function on set R such that for
each pair (D,Y ) ∈ R,
λ(D,Y ) ∈ Y . (3)
The set of all choice functions is denoted by Λ.
Claim 1. w ⊢ ⟦C :∧Σ′⟧s for each finite set Σ′ ⊆ Σ.
Proof of Claim. Consider any formula σ ∈ Σ′. Then, because
Σ′ ⊆ Σ, by equation (2), there must exist a formula ⟦E :Z⟧s ∈ w
such that σ is equal to ∨Z . Then,w ⊢ ⟦E :σ⟧s by Lemma 6.9. Hence,
w ⊢ ⟦C :σ⟧s by Lemma 6.6 and the Modus Ponens inference rule.
Therefore,w ⊢ ⟦C :∧Σ′⟧s , by Lemma 6.5. ⊠
Claim 2. For each finite set R′ ⊆ R,
w ⊢
C :
∧
(D,Y )∈R′
λ(D,Y )
 λ ∈ Λ


s
.
Proof of Claim. Consider any (D,Y ) ∈ R′ ⊆ R. Then, ⟦D :Y⟧s ∈ w
and D ⊆ C due to equation (1). Thus, by Lemma 6.7 and the Modus
Ponens rule,w ⊢ ⟦C :Y⟧s . Hence,w ⊢ ⟦C :Y⟧s for each (D,Y ) ∈ R′.
Thus,
w ⊢
∧
(D,Y )∈R′
⟦C :Y⟧s .
Next, note that the following formula is provable in our logical
system by Lemma 6.4:∧
(D,Y )∈R′
⟦C :Y⟧s →
C :
∧
(D,Y )∈R′
λ(D,Y )
 λ ∈ Λ


s
.
Therefore,
w ⊢
C :
∧
(D,Y )∈R′
λ(D,Y )
 λ ∈ Λ


s
by the Modus Ponens inference rule. ⊠
Claim 3. For all finite sets Σ′ ⊆ Σ and R′ ⊆ R,
w ⊢
C :∧Σ′ ∧
∧
(D,Y )∈R′
λ(D,Y )
 λ ∈ Λ


s
.
Proof of Claim. The statement of the claim follows from Claim 1
and Claim 2 by Lemma 6.3. ⊠
Claim 4. There is a choice function λ ∈ Λ such that for any
formula φ ∈ X the following set is consistent:
{¬φ} ∪ Σ ∪ {λ(D,Y ) | (D,Y ) ∈ R}.
Proof of Claim. Suppose the opposite. Thus, for any choice func-
tion λ ∈ Λ there is a formula φλ ∈ X such that
Σ, {λ(D,Y ) | (D,Y ) ∈ R} ⊢ φλ .
Hence, since any derivation uses only finitely many assumptions,
for any choice function λ ∈ Λ there are finite sets Σλ ⊆ Σ and
Rλ ⊆ R such that
Σλ , {λ(D,Y ) | (D,Y ) ∈ Rλ } ⊢ φλ .
Recall that set X is finite by definition of language Φ. Then, set
{φλ | λ ∈ Λ} ⊆ X is also finite (although set Λ might be infinite).
Hence, there are finite sets R′ ⊆ R and Σ′ ⊆ Σ such that, for each
choice function λ ∈ Λ,
Σ′, {λ(D,Y ) | (D,Y ) ∈ R′} ⊢ φλ .
Thus, by the deduction theorem and the laws of propositional rea-
soning, for each choice function λ ∈ Λ,
⊢ ∧Σ′ ∧
∧
(D,Y )∈R′
λ(D,Y ) → φλ .
Hence, w ⊢ ⟦C : {φλ | λ ∈ Λ}⟧s , by Claim 3 and Lemma 6.8. Then,
w ⊢ ⟦C : X⟧s by Lemma 6.7 and because {φλ |λ ∈ Λ} ⊆ X . Therefore,
¬⟦C : X⟧s < w because set w is consistent, which contradicts the
assumption of the lemma. ⊠
We now return to the proof of the lemma. Let λ0 be the choice
function that exists by Claim 4 and strategy t ∈ ∆C be such that
for each agent a ∈ C ,
t(a) = ({λ0(D,Y ) | (D,Y ) ∈ R}, s(a)). (4)
Consider an arbitrary formula φ ∈ X . By the selection of the choice
function λ0, the set
U = {¬φ} ∪ Σ ∪ {λ0(D,Y ) | (D,Y ) ∈ R} (5)
is consistent. Let u be any maximal consistent extension of set U .
Thus, ¬φ ∈ u. Hence, φ < u because set u is consistent. Define
action profile δ ∈ ∆A as follows:
δ (a) =
{
t(a), if a ∈ C .
(u, s(a)), otherwise. (6)
Then, t =C δ .
Claim 5. |δ (a)|aw = s(a) for each agent a ∈ A.
Proof of Claim.We consider the following two cases separately:
Case I: a ∈ C . Thus, by equation (6), equation (4), and Defini-
tion 6.15,
|δ (a)|aw = |t(a)|aw
= |({λ0(D,Y ) | (D,Y ) ∈ R}, s(a))|aw = s(a).
Case II: a < C . Hence, |δ (a)|aw = |(u, s(a))|aw = s(a). by equation (6)
and Definition 6.15. ⊠
Then, |δ |w ≤ s by Definition 4.2.
Claim 6. (w,δ ,u) ∈ M .
Proof of Claim. We will show the two statements from Defini-
tion 6.16 separately.
(1) To prove that pr1(δ (a)) ⊆ u for each agent a ∈ A, consider
the following two cases:
Case I: a ∈ C . Thus, by equation (6), equation (4), equa-
tion (5), and the choice of set u,
pr1(δ (a)) = pr1(t(a))
= pr1({λ0(D,Y ) | (D,Y ) ∈ R}, s(a))
= {λ0(D,Y ) | (D,Y ) ∈ R} ⊆ U ⊆ u .
Case II: a < C . Hence, by equation (6),
pr1(δ (a)) = pr1(u, s(a)) = u .
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(2) Consider any formula ⟦B :Q⟧r ∈ w such that |δ |w ≤ r . Then,
s ≤ r by Claim 5. Thus,w ⊢ ⟦B :Q⟧s by Lemma 6.7. Hence,
because setw is maximal,
⟦B :Q⟧s ∈ w . (7)
Next, we show that there is an agenta ∈ B such thatpr1(δ (a))∩
Q , . Consider the following two cases separately:
Case I: B ⊆ C . By the definition of the language Φ, set B is
not empty. Let a be an arbitrary element of B. Assumption
B ⊆ C implies (B,Q) ∈ R, by equation (1) and statement (7).
Hence, λ0(B,Q) ∈ Q by equation (3). At the same time, by
equation (4) and equation (6),
λ0(B,Q) ∈ {λ0(D,Y ) | (D,Y ) ∈ R}
= pr1(t(a)) = pr1(δ (a)).
Therefore, pr1(δ (a)) ∩Q , .
Case II: B ⊊ C . Let a be any agent such that a ∈ B \ C .
The assumption B ⊊ C implies that ∨Q ∈ Σ, by equation (2)
and equation (7). Thus, ∨Q ∈ U ⊆ u by equation (5) and
the choice of set u. Hence, there is a formula µ ∈ Q such
that µ ∈ u because u is a maximal consistent set. Then, by
definition (6) and assumption a < C ,
µ ∈ u = pr1(u, s(a)) = pr1(δ (a)).
Therefore, pr1(δ (a)) ∩Q , . ⊠
This concludes the proof of the lemma. □
Lemma 6.20. w ⊩ φ iff φ ∈ w wherew ∈W and φ ∈ Φ.
Proof. We prove the statement of the lemma by induction on
structural complexity of formula φ. If formula φ is a propositional
variable, then the statement of the lemma follows from item 1 of
Definition 4.3 and Definition 6.17. The cases when formula φ is
a negation or an implication follow from item 2 and item 3 of
Definition 4.3 and the maximality and the consistency of setw in
the standard way.
Suppose now that formula φ has form [C :X ]s .
(⇒) : Suppose that [C :X ]s < w . Thus,w ⊬ [C :X ] because setw is
maximal. Hence, eitherw ⊬ ⟦C :X⟧s orw ⊬ ¬∨,Y⊊X ⟦C :Y⟧s by
Lemma 6.12. We consider these two cases separately.
Case I:w ⊬ ⟦C :X⟧s . Thus, ¬⟦C :X⟧s ∈ w because setw is maximal.
Hence, by Lemma 6.19, there is a strategy t ∈ ∆C of coalition C
such that for any formulaψ ∈ X there is an action profile δ ∈ ∆A
and a state u ∈W where |δ |w ≤ s , t =C δ , (w,δ ,u) ∈ M , andψ < u.
Then, by the induction hypothesis, for any formulaψ ∈ X there is
an action profile δ ∈ ∆A and a state u ∈W where |δ |w ≤ s , t =C δ ,
(w,δ ,u) ∈ M , and u ⊮ ψ . Therefore, w ⊮ [C :X ]s by item 4(a) of
Definition 4.3.
Case II:w ⊬ ¬∨,Y⊊X ⟦C :Y⟧s . Then, because setw is maximal,∨
,Y⊊X ⟦C : Y⟧s ∈ w . Thus, again by the maximality of set w ,
there exists a nonempty set Y0 ⊊ X such that ⟦C :Y0⟧s ∈ w . Then,
by Lemma 6.18, for any strategy t ∈ ∆C of coalition C , there is
a formula ψ ∈ Y0 such that for each action profile δ ∈ ∆A and
each state u ∈ W , if |δ |w ≤ s , t =C δ , and (w,δ ,u) ∈ M , then
ψ ∈ u. Thus, by the induction hypothesis, for any strategy t ∈ ∆C
of coalition C , there is a formulaψ ∈ Y0 such that for each profile
δ ∈ ∆A and each stateu ∈W , if |δ |w ≤ s , t =C δ , and (w,δ ,u) ∈ M ,
then u ⊩ ψ . Therefore, w ⊮ [C :X ]s by item 4(b) of Definition 4.3
and the assumption Y0 ⊊ X .
(⇐) : Suppose [C :X ]s ∈ w . To prove that w ⊩ [C :X ]s , we will
verify conditions (a) and (b) in item 4 of Definition 4.3.
(a) By Lemma 6.10 and the Modus Ponens inference rule, as-
sumption [C : X ]s ∈ w implies w ⊢ ⟦C : X⟧s . Hence,
⟦C :X⟧s ∈ w because setw is maximal. Thus, by Lemma 6.18,
for any strategy t ∈ ∆C of coalition C , there is a formula
ψ ∈ X such that for each action profile δ ∈ ∆A and each
state u ∈ W , if |δ |w ≤ s , t =C δ , and (w,δ ,u) ∈ M , then
ψ ∈ u. Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, for any strat-
egy t ∈ ∆C of coalition C , there is a formula ψ ∈ X such
that for each action profile δ ∈ ∆A and each state u ∈W , if
|δ |w ≤ s , t =C δ , and (w,δ ,u) ∈ M , then u ⊩ ψ .
(b) By Lemma 6.11 and the Modus Ponens inference rule, as-
sumption [C : X ]s ∈ w implies w ⊢ ¬∨,Y⊊X ⟦C : Y⟧s .
Hence,w ⊢ ∧,Y⊊X ¬⟦C :Y⟧s by the laws of propositional
reasoning. Thus, ¬⟦C :Y⟧s ∈ w for each nonempty subset
Y ⊊ X because setw is maximal. Then, by Lemma 6.19, for
each nonempty subset Y ⊊ X there is a strategy t ∈ ∆C
of coalition C such that for any formula ψ ∈ Y there is an
action profile δ ∈ ∆A and a state u ∈ W where |δ |w ≤ s ,
t =C δ , (w,δ ,u) ∈ M , and ψ < u. Therefore, by the induc-
tion hypothesis, for each nonempty subset Y ⊊ X there is
a strategy t ∈ ∆C of coalition C such that for any formula
ψ ∈ Y there is an action profile δ ∈ ∆A and a state u ∈W
where |δ |w ≤ s , t =C δ , (w,δ ,u) ∈ M , and u ⊮ ψ .
This concludes the proof of the lemma. □
6.3 Strong Completeness Theorem
Theorem 6.21. For any set of formulae X and any formula φ, if
X ⊬ φ, then there is a game and a state w of this game such that
w ⊩ χ for each formula χ ∈ X andw ⊮ φ.
Proof. Suppose X ⊬ φ. Thus, set X ∪ {¬φ} is consistent. Let
w be any maximal consistent extension of this set. Then, w ⊩ χ
for each formula χ ∈ X by Lemma 6.20 and the choice of set w .
In addition, w ⊩ ¬φ also by Lemma 6.20 and the choice of set w .
Therefore,w ⊮ φ by item 2 of Definition 4.3. □
7 CONCLUSION
The contribution of this paper is two-fold. Firstly, we introduce
a formal semantics for trolley-like ethical dilemmas in a strategic
game settings expressed through the “trolley” modality [C : X ]s .
Secondly, we give a sound and complete axiomatization of univer-
sally true properties of this modality. The completeness result is the
strong completeness theorem with respect to the proposed seman-
tics. We believe that the standard filtration technique could be used
to proveweak completeness with respect to the class of finite games.
This would imply decidability of our logical system, assuming the
sacrifice function is rational-valued functions. Another possible
extension of this work is to study ethical dilemmas in an imperfect
information setting, where [C :X ]s would mean that not only does
coalitionC force a specific formula in set X to be true, but coalition
C also knows which one.
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